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Hart, Gary. The Shield and the Cloak: The Security
of the Commons. New York: Oxford Univ. Press,
2006. 194pp. $22

Gary Hart offers a bold grand strategy
to deal with the complexities of security
in the twenty-first century. He states
that America will fail in defining its role
in the world if it does not recognize a
broader definition of security. Security
narrowly defined as “prevention of
physical harm by creating a protective
shield” is insufficient. The “cloak” of
economic, environmental, health, energy, educational, and government security provides “genuine security.”
Hart argues against the Bush administration’s “narrow” focus on the war on
terrorism, the promotion of democracy,
and its emphasis on unilateralism and
preemptive use of military force.
Hart’s cooperative security strategy
embraces liberalism expanded to deal
with a multidimensional security environment. A major theme is securing
the “commons.” “Central, is a sense
that we are not alone, that our security, in an age of global integration, is
reliant on a global community—a
commons—with increased opportunity and responsibility.”
Three principles inform Hart’s grand
strategy. First, “Our economic cloak is
the basis of our strength, and our
strength is the basis for our world leadership.” Hart calls for investment in
knowledge through a new national security education act to increase scientists, engineers, and teachers. His
energy policy would encourage moves
toward independence (zero imports).
A Persian Gulf treaty alliance comprising oil-producing and consuming
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nations would guarantee oil flow.
Hart’s economic agenda would reward
savings, investment, and productivity
and penalize borrowing, debt, and
consumption.
Second, “America’s role in the world is
to resist hegemony without seeking hegemony by the creation of a new global
commonwealth focused on stability,
growth, and security.” Hart proposes
reforming international institutions, focusing global development assistance
on individuals, and increasing control
of weapons of mass destruction. He
suggests an international “peace-making”
force that would be “part constabulary
and part special forces . . . inserted into
zones of violence.”
Third, “to respond to this century’s new
threats, the U.S. military shield must be
comprised of these principles: flexibility,
reform, and intelligence.” Hart recommends appreciation of fourth-generation
warfare and establishment of a human
intelligence corps within the CIA. He
consolidates all special forces into a
fifth service, and brings the National
Guard home to reassume its traditional
duties of guarding the homeland.
One minor weakness is repetition in
successive chapters.
Hart has served as a U.S. senator for
twelve years, serving on the Armed Services Committee—the first congressional committee to investigate the CIA.
Most important is his work as co-chair
of the U.S. Commission on National
Security for the Twenty-first Century,
which in 1999 predicted catastrophic
terrorist attacks on the United States,
and in January 2001 recommended a
department of homeland security.
Readers will do well to consider his
proposed grand strategy. It is rare to
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find a single plan laid out in such complete detail.
RICHMOND M. LLOYD

William B. Ruger Chair of
National Security Economics
Naval War College

Turner, Stansfield. Burn before Reading: Presidents,
CIA Directors, and Central Intelligence. New York:
Hyperion, 2005. 319pp. $23.95

Presumably Stansfield Turner did not
devise the nonsensical title of this history
of the DCI’s (Director, Central Intelligence) relationship with the president of
the United States.
In twelve chapters on chief executives
from Franklin D. Roosevelt through
George W. Bush, Turner discusses the
nineteen men who headed America’s intelligence organization. “Within six
months of Pearl Harbor, FDR’s enthusiasm for ‘Wild Bill’ [Donovan’s] ‘innovative thinking’ had evaporated,” Turner
writes, noting that Donovan was never
given access to the ULTRA/MAGIC
code-breaking program, and he regularly
lost struggles with the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and J. Edgar Hoover.
In January 1946, Harry Truman created
the Central Intelligence Group and appointed Sidney Souers as the first director of central intelligence, with simple
expectations: “to keep him personally
well-informed of all that was going on in
the outside world.” By September 1949,
however, the CIA had not been privy to
Atomic Energy Commission information, so the day after Truman learned
that the Soviet Union had exploded its
first atomic bomb, he read Intelligence
Memorandum 225: “The earliest possible date by which the USSR might be
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expected to produce an atomic bomb is
mid-1950 and the most probable date is
mid-1953.”
Turner recounts subsequent intelligence
failures, but because the manuscript was
submitted to the CIA for security review,
few readers should be surprised by this
history.
While most facts are familiar, Turner’s
thesis is that the director of Central Intelligence serves the president in two capacities: leading the CIA in providing
unbiased intelligence; and heading the
intelligence community, “fifteen federal
agencies, offices, and bureaus within the
executive branch.” Turner evaluates the
eighteen DCIs before Porter Goss on
how each performed both tasks, including his own service under Jimmy Carter.
If Turner is frank about errors he made,
he excoriates his successor, Bill Casey.
“Overall, I found this transition group to
be as unbalanced, opinionated, and unwilling to listen as any group I have ever
encountered. They came to their task
with their minds made up, and no facts
were going to change their conclusions.”
Fifteen blistering pages recount Casey’s
politicization of the agency and obsession with covert actions, culminating in
his leading Ollie North to undertake
“two highly illegal operations—selling
arms to Iran and funneling the money to
the contras in Nicaragua.”
Turner devotes the final chapter to reflections on the 2005 Intelligence Reform Act. “The big question, then, is
whether President Bush will line up with
the presidents since FDR who have favored giving more authority to the DCI
or whether he will give in to the Defense
Department’s persistent efforts to keep
the DCI’s authority limited.” Noting that
“the CIA’s reputation in the country is at
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